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ABSTRACT 
Despite intense recent research, the neural correlates of conscious visual perception 
remain elusive.  The most established paradigm for studying brain mechanisms 
underlying conscious perception is to keep the physical sensory inputs constant and 
identify brain activities that correlate with the changing content of conscious awareness. 
However, such a contrast based on conscious content alone would not only reveal brain 
activities directly contributing to conscious perception, but also include brain activities 
that precede or follow it.  To address this issue, we devised a paradigm whereby we 
collected, trial-by-trial, measures of objective performance, subjective awareness and the 
confidence level of subjective awareness.  Using magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
recordings in healthy human volunteers, we dissociated brain activities underlying these 
different cognitive phenomena.  Our results provide strong evidence that widely 
distributed slow cortical potentials (SCPs) correlate with subjective awareness, even after 
the effects of objective performance and confidence were both removed.  The SCP 
correlate of conscious perception manifests strongly in its waveform, phase and power.  
By contrast, objective performance and confidence were both contributed by relatively 
transient brain activity.  These results shed new light on the brain mechanisms of 
conscious, unconscious and metacognitive processing.   


 
INTRODUCTION
The elucidation of brain mechanisms underlying conscious perception requires distilling 
neural processes directly contributing to conscious awareness from those that precede, 
follow or co-vary with it.  Most investigations on brain mechanisms underlying conscious 
perception have adopted a “minimal contrast” approach, that is, to hold the sensory inputs 
as constant as possible and identify brain activities that correlate with the changing 
content of conscious awareness (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011).  However, such a 
contrast between perceptual conditions would not only reveal the neural correlates of 
conscious perception (NCC) per se, but also include the prerequisites for (NCC-pr) and 
the consequences of (NCC-co) conscious perception (Bachmann, 2009; Aru et al., 2012a; 
de Graaf et al., 2012).  An example of the NCC-pr is the gross brain excitability or 
attentional state at stimulus onset that biases whether the stimulus is consciously 
perceived or not.  Examples of the NCC-co include the rendering of verbal report and 
construction of long-term memory.  

We aimed to address this issue by controlling for behavioral variables correlated with 
conscious perception.  Combining liminal stimulation, forced alternative-choice and trial-
by-trial introspection (Sergent et al., 2005; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Lamy et al., 
2009; Fleming et al., 2010; Rounis and Lau, 2010; Hesselmann et al., 2011), we devised 
a paradigm in which we collected, on every single trial, measures of objective 
performance, subjective awareness, and confidence level about subjective awareness 
(Fig. 1A).  The mutual correlations between these behavioral measures suggest that a 
simple experimental contrast of subjective awareness (seen vs. unseen) would likely 
 
include brain activities underlying objective performance and confidence as well.  
However, the trial-by-trial collection of all three behavioral measures allowed us to 
disentangle brain activities associated with each of them.  Our reasoning is as follows: 
since the NCC-pr affects both subjective awareness and objective performance (Lamme, 
2003; Dehaene et al., 2006) while the NCC only contributes to subjective awareness (by 
definition), including the factor of objective performance in our design should help 
separating the NCC from NCC-pr.  Similarly, since metacognitive processes are a 
component of the NCC-co (Aru et al., 2012a), including confidence measure in our 
paradigm should facilitate isolating the NCC from NCC-co.

We combined this behavioral paradigm with MEG recording to investigate brain 
activities underlying conscious perception, with the correlated effects of objective 
performance and confidence removed.  We further aimed to test the SCP hypothesis of 
conscious awareness (He and Raichle, 2009b).  This idea postulates that the SCPs – the 
low-frequency (<4 Hz) component of brain field potentials (He et al., 2008) – might be a 
correlate of conscious awareness.  Previous studies have established that long-lasting 
excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) at the apical dendrites of pyramidal neurons in 
the superficial layers are the major contributor to surface-recorded SCPs (Mitzdorf, 1985; 
Birbaumer et al., 1990; He and Raichle, 2009b).  While the SCP is traditionally recorded 
with scalp-electroencephalography (EEG) (Birbaumer et al., 1990) or surface-
electrocorticography (ECoG) (He et al., 2008), it has recently been shown that the SCP 
can also be recorded using MEG (Brookes et al., 2005; Leistner et al., 2007).

 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects
The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the National Institute 
of Neurological Disorders and Stroke.  All subjects were right-handed, neurologically 
healthy with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  Eleven subjects between 22 and 38 
years of age (mean age 27; six females) participated in the first phase of the study 
consisting of a single MEG session lasting ~3 hours.  Two additional subjects (both 
female, age 24 and 25) performed three MEG sessions and one EEG session on separate 
days using an identical task (see Assessment of Test-retest Reliability and EEG Data 
Collection).  Lastly, a second cohort of 11 subjects (age range: 23 to 39, mean 25 years; 
seven females) each participated in a session of behavioral testing with a modified 
version of the task (see Behavioral Control for the Length of Post-stimulus Blank 
Period).  All subjects provided written informed consent.   

Stimuli and Task 
The stimulus was shown on a Panasonic DLP Projector (PT-D3500U, refresh rate: 60 Hz) 
with a 10% neutral density optical filter in front of the lens.  The filter was applied to 
make the luminance as low as 1 cd/m2 on the stimulus screen, such that every subject 
could reach a threshold duration longer than 16.7 ms – the limitation of the projector 
refresh rate.  The stimulus was presented on a screen 75 cm away from the subject’s eyes.  
Dark adaptation (at least 30 minutes) was conducted for all 11 subjects before any 
behavior data were collected.

 
Each trial started with a white fixation cross on a gray background (Fig. 1A).  When the 
subject was ready, s/he pressed a button to start the trial.  After a blank screen of a 
random duration between 2 and 6 sec (following an exponential distribution), a Gabor 
patch (1° visual angle/cycle) with a very low contrast (1%) was presented for a short 
duration (see below).  The orientation of the Gabor patch was randomly selected between 
45° and 135° with equal chance.  Then another blank screen with a duration randomly 
chosen between 3 and 6 sec (following an exponential distribution) was presented.  The 
luminance of the blank screens was equal to the background luminance of the stimulus 
screen.  The first blank period ensured that the subject could not predict the onset of the 
stimulus.  The second blank period allowed enough time after stimulus offset for the 
analyses of slow MEG activity uncontaminated by responses to questions.  Each trial 
ended with three sequential questions: i) A forced alternative-choice – Was the Gabor 
patch pointing to upper-left (135°) or upper-right (45°)?  ii) Did you see the stimulus 
(Gabor patch) or not?  iii) On a scale of 1 to 4, how confident are you about your answer 
to question ii, with level 4 indicating “absolutely sure” and level 1 “not sure at all”.  The 
three questions were designed to probe objective performance (OBJ), subjective 
awareness (SUB) and confidence level (CONF), respectively.  Subjects indicated their 
answers to the questions via a fibreoptic key-pad (LumiTouch).   

The experiment was conducted in two stages.  In the first stage, the duration of the Gabor 
patch was adjusted using Levitt’s staircase method (Levitt, 1971), until an individually 
titrated threshold for subjective awareness was found (i.e., the subject answers “seen” to 
Question ii in about half of the trials).  The full trial as described above was used in this 
 	
stage to familiarize the subject with the different questions.  The distribution of threshold 
duration across subjects was as follows: six subjects: 33.3 ms; three subjects: 50 ms; two 
subjects: 66.7 ms.  Once the threshold duration was determined, in the second stage of the 
experiment, trials were shown repeatedly with identical stimulus duration at the subject’s 
individual threshold while MEG signals were continuously recorded.  Subjects performed 
these trials in sessions of <12 min long and were allowed to rest between sessions.  In 
total, 113 ~ 277 trials were acquired in each subject (mean±s.d. across subjects: 
183.5±56.4) after artifact rejection.  Additionally, 6 ~ 10 catch trials without a stimulus 
were shown for each subject.  All of the reported behavioral and MEG results are from 
the second stage of the experiment only.  

Data Acquisition 
Experiments were conducted in a whole head 275-channel CTF MEG scanner (VSM 
MedTech, Coquitlam, Canada).  MEG data were collected under a sampling rate of 600 
Hz with an anti-aliasing filter at <150 Hz.  Before and after each recording session, the 
head position of the subject was measured with respect to the MEG sensor array, using 
coils placed on the ear canals and the bridge of the nose.  All MEG data samples were 
corrected with respect to the refresh delay of the projector (measured with a photodiode).
In 10 out of 11 subjects, anatomical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data were 
acquired on a General Electric 3T scanner with an 8-channel head coil, using a MP-
RAGE sequence with a resolution of 1×1×1 mm3.  The MEG data were aligned to the 
anatomical MRI, using the coils placed at the anatomical landmarks.  

 

Event-related Fields (ERFs) and Sensor-space Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The Fieldtrip package (http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl) implemented in Matlab (Mathworks 
Inc.) was used for data analysis.  First, the whole recording from each session was 
detrended, mean-removed, and bandpass filtered at 0.05 ~ 35 Hz with a 4th order 
Butterworth filter (all filtering was done offline with an acausal filter).  Second, data were 
epoched from 1 sec before the stimulus onset to 3 sec after.  Third, independent 
component analysis (ICA) was performed to remove eye movement and cardiac artifacts 
(Bell and Sejnowski, 1995), and trials with artifacts were rejected manually.  Fourth, 
baseline-correction was carried out using a window of -500 ~ 0 ms.   

The resulted dataset were subjected to ERF analysis, sensor-space and source-space 
ANOVA.  ERF analysis consisted of averaging across trials defined as the same type 
(e.g., seen vs. unseen).  For sensor-space ANOVA, the data were down-sampled to 100 
Hz before a trial-by-trial three-way ANOVA (factors: SUB, OBJ and CONF; dependent 
measure: MEG activity) was conducted at every sensor location and time point.   

Source Localization  
Source localization was conducted using the cortically constrained L2 minimum-norm 
estimate (MNE) implemented in Fieldtrip for the ten subjects in whom anatomical MRI 
data were collected.  First, brain surface for each subject was segmented and registered to 
the spherical atlas in Freesurfer (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/fswiki).  Then the 
mesh points of the surface were decimated using the MNE suite 
(http://www.martinos.org/mne/) to obtain the same number of nodes on the cortical 
 
surface for each individual (N = 4098 for each hemisphere).  A single-shell model was 
applied to each individual’s cortical surface to construct the forward model. 

Standard source localization methods are typically applied to trial-averaged ERFs [(Dale 
and Sereno, 1993; Hämäläinen, 2005) but see (Brookes et al., 2011)].  However, in our 
case, the correlation between different behavioral measures precludes the ERF as an 
accurate reflection of brain activity unequivocally underlying each behavioral measure.  
To resolve this issue, we constructed the source estimate for each trial individually and 
performed a trial-by-trial analysis in the source space.  In other words, the source 
estimate of each trial was obtained without information from other trials, so as not to 
introduce correlation among behavioral factors in the source space and to allow unbiased 
trial-by-trial analysis.  For the estimation of noise covariance matrix at the single-trial 
level, we used the entire time course of the full epoch (-1 ~ 3 sec) of each trial, instead of 
just the pre-stimulus window, to achieve a more stable estimate (Brookes et al., 2011).  
We performed a control analysis to compare the noise covariance matrices estimated 
from the pre-stimulus window and from the full epoch, and found them to be highly 
similar (all P < 1e-16, assessed by spatial correlation of the half-matrix).  Lastly, current 
estimates were transformed into an approximately normal distribution (using boxcox
function in matlab) (Yao and Dewald, 2005; Watthanacheewakul, 2010), and a three-way 
ANOVA (factors: SUB, OBJ and CONF; dependent measure: source activity estimate) 
was carried out at every source location in each subject to isolate the effect due to each 
behavioral measure.  Source-space ANOVA was performed at selected time points from 
100 ms to 2.5 sec after stimulus onset.  
 
For population analysis, results from each subject were smoothed using a 6-mm-width 
kernel.  The percentage of subjects showing a significant effect at each source location 
and time point was then calculated and subjected to binomial statistics (He, 2013; He and 
Zempel, 2013).    

Frequency-domain Analyses 
For frequency-domain analyses, MEG data were epoched from 2 sec before the stimulus 
onset to 3 sec after.  A longer pre-stimulus window was used to allow better estimation of 
low-frequency phase and power.  For the analysis on phase, MEG data were filtered in 20 
frequency bands: [0.05, 1], [1, 3], [3, 5], [5, 7] … [37 39] Hz using a 3rd order 
Butterworth filter.  Then, in each trial, instantaneous phase was extracted from each 
frequency band using Hilbert transform.  The phase time series from each sensor was 
down-sampled to 50 Hz before a trial-by-trial two-way circular ANOVA was conducted 
at each time-frequency location in each subject (factors: SUB and OBJ; dependent 
variable: phase).  A two-way instead of three-way circular ANOVA was used because 
statistical methods for circular data are still in development (Berens, 2009).  All circular 
statistics were carried out using the CircStat toolbox implemented in Matlab (Berens, 
2009).

For the analysis on power, a Gabor wavelet      


   with 
!  "# was used.  The following center frequencies were analyzed: from 2 to 30 Hz with 
1-Hz steps; from 31 to 61 Hz with 2-Hz steps; and from 63 to 148 Hz with 5-Hz steps.  2 
Hz was the lowest frequency analyzed because accurate estimation of power requires 
 
sufficient length of data, which was limited by the length of the trial.  Power time series 
from each trial were log-transformed into roughly normally distributed data (Wyart and 
Tallon-Baudry, 2008), and baseline corrected using a window of -750 ~ -550 ms.  A trial-
by-trial three-way ANOVA was conducted at every time-frequency-sensor location in 
each subject (factors: SUB, OBJ and CONF; dependent variable: MEG power).  In 
addition, a two-sample t-test was carried out for the effect of subjective awareness (seen 
vs. unseen) and objective performance (correct vs. incorrect) respectively.   

For group analysis, significant sensors from the ANOVA (for the effect of SUB or OBJ, 
at a P < 0.05 level) were pooled together by summing the t-score from the corresponding 
t-test across sensors [T, see (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008) for the use of a similar 
metric].  To assess whether positive and negative t-scores might be cancelled out during 
this process, we performed a control analysis: At each time-frequency location, sensors 
with positive and negative t-scores were summed together separately.  The results from 
this analysis confirmed that positive and negative t-scores were largely separate in the 
time-frequency space, suggesting that cancellation effect was minimal.   

The T metric indexes the total level of “seen vs. unseen” or “correct vs. incorrect” 
contrast across the brain.  Because only significant sensors from the ANOVA were 
included, correlations between different behavioral measures were minimized.  T is a 
normally distributed variable and was subjected to a one-sample t-test across the 11 
subjects (H0: T = 0).  Lastly, the population-level results were assessed for statistical 
significance using a nonparametric permutation test, which effectively controls the type I 
 
error (i.e., the false alarm rate) in a situation of multiple comparisons by clustering 
neighboring time-frequency points that exhibit the same effect (Nichols and Holmes, 
2002; Jokisch and Jensen, 2007; Medendorp et al., 2007). 

Distribution of Preferred Phase in Seen vs. Unseen Trials 
This analysis was applied to the phase of the lowest frequency band (0.05 ~ 1 Hz) at 
stimulus onset only.   
Cluster-level analysis 
For each subject, P-values from the two-way circular ANOVA on phase (factors: SUB, 
OBJ) for the effect of subjective awareness were plotted on the scalp.  In all subjects, 
significant sensors formed spatial clusters. We adjusted the P-value threshold (all P < 
0.001) to define at least two well-separated clusters in each subject.  The two largest 
clusters in each subject were extracted. For each cluster thus defined, we pooled across 
all sensors within the cluster and all seen (or unseen) trials.  A circular histogram of 
phase was constructed for seen and unseen trials separately, using 10 evenly distributed 
phase bins.  The histogram shows the fraction of trials falling into each bin.  The circular-
mean of this histogram was computed to obtain the averaged vector.  The norm of this 
vector defined the phase-locking value (PLV) (Tallon-Baudry et al., 1996; Lachaux et al., 
1999) and the angle of this vector defined the preferred phase.  The PLV provides a direct 
index of the concentration of phase across trials, and the preferred phase describes the 
most common phase among the group of trials analyzed.
Sensor-level analysis 
All sensors with a significant effect for subjective awareness (at a P < 0.001 level) from 
 
the two-way ANOVA on phase were included in this analysis.  For each sensor, the phase 
from each trial was described as a unit vector with the corresponding angle.  This vector 
was circular-averaged across trials of the same type (seen vs. unseen) to obtain the 
averaged vector, the amplitude and angle of which then defined the PLV and the 
preferred phase of this particular sensor.

Analysis on Confidence 
Because ANOVA cannot reveal brain activity monotonically related to confidence, we 
used an alternative method – ordinal logistic regression (De Martino et al., 2013).
Confidence ranking (values: 1, 2, 3, 4) was an ordinal variable treated as the dependent 
measure.  Independent measures included the estimated source activity (continuous 
variable), subjective awareness and objective performance (binary variables).  The 
regression model is as follows: 
,
where c is the confidence level and i takes values of 1, 2 and 3.  is the source activity, 
 and  are the answers to the subjective awareness (0 – unseen; 1 – seen) and 
objective performance (0 – incorrect; 1 – correct) questions respectively, and ,  
and  are the associated regression coefficients.  The left hand of the above equation is 
called a logit function.  For each logit function (associated with a particular i value) there 
was a different intercept term , but the regression coefficients ,  and were 
the same across the three logit functions.  Positive β values indicate a positive correlation, 
i.e., higher confidence levels were associated with a larger predictor value.  The mnrfit
log P(c ≤ i)
1− P(c ≤ i)
= ai − βactSact − βsubAsub − βobj Aobj
Sact
Asub Aobj
βact βsub
βobj
ai βact βsub βobj
 
function in Matlab was used to carry out the ordinal logistic regression.

For group analysis, we first computed the number of subjects showing a significant (P < 
0.05) at each source location.  Only source locations with at least two subjects 
showing a significant result (corresponding to population P < 0.07, binomial statistics) 
were analyzed further.  We then computed an agreement coefficient showing the degree 
of agreement across subjects in terms of the sign of .  To this end, we first 
determined the number of subjects with a significant positive or negative , designated 
Npos and Nneg respectively.  The agreement coefficient (AC) was calculated as follows: 
If Npos > Nneg,  AC = Npos / (Npos + Nneg);
If Npos < Nneg,  AC = -Nneg / (Npos + Nneg);
If Npos = Nneg, AC = 0.
In order to accurately estimate the agreement coefficient, single-subject results were not 
subjected to spatial smoothing in this analysis.   

Assessment of Test-retest Reliability and Control for Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)  
In order to assess test-retest reliability, we collected a substantially larger amount of data 
in two additional subjects (Subj. #12 and #13).  Each of these subjects completed three 
experimental sessions on three different days, with each session lasting ~3 hours.  The 
task design was the same as described above.  In total, 1010 and 890 trials were recorded 
in the two subjects (after artifact rejection), respectively.  For each session, the MEG data 
were analyzed for sensor-space ERF and ANOVA according to procedures described 
above.  Furthermore, in order to control for the unbalanced number of trials across 
βact
βact
βact
 
behavioral conditions, which results in differential SNR, we equated the number of trials 
across behavioral conditions in an additional ERF analysis by randomly dropping out a 
fraction of trials (these trials were evenly distributed throughout the session).  Because 
the head position relative to MEG sensors varied across experimental sessions, each 
session was analyzed separately.

EEG Data Collection and Analysis 
The same two subjects (Subj. #12 and 13) each participated in an additional EEG session 
under an identical task design.  EEG data were recorded using a 64-channel DC-EEG 
system (BrainAmpDC, Brain Products GmbH) with a mastoid reference in an EMI-
shielded, sound and lighting controlled room.  Vertical and horizontal electrooculogram 
(EOG) were simultaneously recorded.  Analysis steps were as follows: 1) rejecting 
channels and data segments contaminated by artifacts via inspection of the raw data 
records; 2) filtering between 0.05 and 150 Hz; 3) re-referencing to a linked-mastoid 
reference; 4) removal of eye blink and eye movement artifacts by an ocular correction 
ICA (Infomax Extended ICA implemented in Analyzer2, Brain Products GmbH); 5) 
epoching from 1 sec before to 3 sec after stimulus onset; 6) baseline correction using a 
window of -500 ~ 0 ms; and 7) averaging across trials to yield event-related potentials 
(ERPs).  300 trials were recorded in each subject, including 10% catch trials.   

Behavioral Control for the Length of Post-stimulus Blank Period 
So far, our paradigm has used a 3~6 sec post-stimulus blank period in order to extract 
slow brain activity uncontaminated by the behavioral responses.  In order to control for 
 
the potential decay of working memory during this period, we conducted behavioral 
testing in an additional cohort of 11 subjects using a 200-ms-long post-stimulus blank 
period under an otherwise identical behavioral paradigm.  Testing was conducted in a 
sound and lighting controlled room outside the MEG scanner.  314±48 (mean±SEM) 
trials were recorded in each subject, including 10% catch trials.

RESULTS 
Behavioral Results 
The task design is illustrated in Fig. 1A and explained in detail in Materials and Methods 
(section Stimuli and Task).  Subjects reported seeing the stimulus in 48.9±4.4%
(mean±SEM across subjects) of trials, suggesting that the threshold for subjective 
awareness was successfully reached.  In addition, they answered correctly about the 
orientation of the Gabor patch in 79.5±2.5% of trials (Fig. 1B, chance level = 50%).  
When subjects reported seeing the stimulus, they correctly identified the orientation of 
the Gabor patch in 96.8±1.3% trials (Fig. 1C).  Interestingly, even when they denied 
seeing the stimulus, their objective performance remained above chance level (%correct: 
62.0±2.7%, P = 0.001, assessed by a Wilcoxon signed rank test against 50%).  This is 
consistent with the “blindsight” phenomenon reported in many previous studies, i.e., even 
when the subject denies seeing the stimulus, their performance in a forced alternative-
choice question can be well above chance level (Weiskrantz, 2004; Lau and Passingham, 
2006; Del Cul et al., 2009; Hesselmann et al., 2011).  Since subjects’ performance in 
orientation discrimination was much better in “seen” than “unseen” trials (Fig. 1C), 
objective performance and subjective awareness were indeed correlated from trial to trial.   
 	

When we considered objective performance against both subjective awareness and 
confidence (Fig. 1D), we found that confidence has opposite relationships with objective 
performance in seen vs. unseen trials.  In seen trials, the more confident the subject was 
about having seen the stimulus, the better the objective performance.  In unseen trials, the 
more confident the subject was about not seeing the stimulus, the lower their objective 
performance.  A two-way ANOVA indicated a significant effect of both factors and their 
interaction (SUB: P < 1e-15; CONF: P = 0.002; SUB × CONF: P = 1e-5).  Considering 
subjective awareness against objective performance and confidence (Fig. 1E), we found a 
significant effect of objective performance (P < 1e-8, assessed by a two-way ANOVA), a 
trend effect for confidence (P = 0.08), and a non-significant interaction effect (OBJ ×
CONF: P > 0.6).

Event-Related Fields
We first investigated how trial-averaged ERFs vary with objective performance and 
subjective awareness.  Separating all trials according to subjective awareness, we found 
that compared to unseen trials, seen trials were characterized by dramatically enhanced 
long-lasting ERFs starting from ~300 ms after stimulus onset and persisting for 2~3 sec, 
spanning the entire duration of the trial. Data from an example subject (Subj. #1) is 
presented in Fig. 2A (top panels); similar qualitative results were obtained in all subjects.
Importantly, this long-lasting activity is not of an oscillatory nature but rather is a slow 
DC-type drift – a signature of the SCP.  In Subj. #1, there was also an ERF peak at ~250 
ms that was more pronounced in seen than unseen trials; however, this peak was less 
 

reproducible across subjects.  Separating all trials according to correct vs. incorrect 
objective performance yielded similar results, although the magnitude of the long-lasting 
activity in correct trials was smaller than that in seen trials (Fig. 2A, bottom panels).  
However, because subjective awareness and objective performance were correlated from 
trial to trial (Fig. 1C-E), the similarity between ERFs of seen trials and correct trials 
could simply be due to a fraction of shared trials between them.   

Indeed, when we sorted all trials according to the combination of subjective awareness 
and objective performance, we found that only trials that were both seen and correct still 
contained long-lasting ERFs (Fig. 2B, data from Subj. #1).  Unseen trials, whether correct 
or incorrect, did not contain long-lasting ERFs (Fig. 2B).  For group analysis, we 
performed grand average on the absolute value of the MEG activity time course across all 
sensors and all subjects, for the three task conditions separately: Seen and correct; 
Unseen and correct; Unseen and incorrect (Fig. 2C).  Because on average 96.8% of seen 
trials had correct objective performance, there were not enough trials in the “Seen and 
incorrect” condition for a separate ERF analysis.  As can be seen in Fig. 2C, under 
identical objective performance (“correct”), long-lasting MEG activity is only present in 
“seen” trials but not “unseen” trials.  By contrast, under identical subjective awareness 
condition (“unseen”), there was no difference in the long-lasting activity between correct 
and incorrect trials.  These results suggest that long-lasting MEG activity is associated 
with the state of subjective awareness but not objective performance.  While the above 
results are qualitative, to quantitatively dissociate brain activities underlying subjective 
 
awareness and objective performance, and to control for the effect of confidence, we next 
performed a trial-by-trial factorial analysis.

Trial-by-trial ANOVA on MEG Activity 
A three-way ANOVA, with trial-to-trial MEG activity as the dependent variable and the 
three independent factors being OBJ, SUB and CONF, was carried out on the MEG 
activity from every sensor in each subject.  The sensor-time locations at which MEG 
activity correlated with subjective awareness or objective performance in three 
representative subjects are shown in Fig. 3A.  To present the full data set, we used a 
liberal threshold here (P < 0.05, uncorrected).  Long-lasting MEG activity still correlated 
with subjective awareness after the effects of OBJ and CONF were both controlled for 
(Fig. 3A left).  By contrast, after the effects of SUB and CONF were removed, long-
lasting activity no longer correlated with objective performance (Fig. 3A right).  Similar 
qualitative patterns were observed at the single-subject level in the remaining subjects.  
These results are in line with the ERF results reported above.  Because the sign of the 
MEG signal depends on the geometry of the underlying dipole current flow in relation to 
sensor position and orientation, whether seen trials had higher activity than unseen trials 
in a particular sensor (warm colors in Fig. 3A) or vice versa (cool colors) was relatively 
arbitrary.

For population analysis, we compared the number of sensors showing a significant 
correlation to subjective awareness (P < 0.05 for SUB effect, from the three-way 
ANOVA) with those showing a significant correlation to objective performance (P < 0.05 
 
for OBJ effect) at each time point across subjects (Fig. 3B-C).  The number of sensors 
correlated with objective performance stayed relatively flat throughout the trial.  By 
contrast, the number of sensors correlated with subjective awareness abruptly increased at 
~200 ms; thereafter it reached peak at ~500 ms and slowly returned to baseline over 2 ~ 3 
sec.  This result was robust to the particular threshold used for determining significant 
sensors (P < 0.01, Fig. 3D; P < 0.001, Fig. 3E).

Source Localization 
To localize brain activities underlying subjective awareness and objective performance 
respectively, we performed source localization on single-trial MEG data in the ten 
subjects with anatomical MRI data.  A three-way ANOVA (factors: OBJ, SUB and 
CONF; dependent variable: estimated source activity) was carried out at every source 
location in each subject.  We focus on the effects of SUB and OBJ here, which show the 
estimated source activity significantly correlated with subjective awareness or objective 
performance respectively, each with the other two behavioral factors controlled for.  Fig. 
4 plots the percentage of subjects at each source location and time point that showed a 
significant (P < 0.05) result for SUB or OBJ effect, thresholded at 40% (P < 0.001, 
uncorrected).  The highest level of overlap across subjects was 90% for subjective 
awareness (corresponding to P < 2e-11) and 80% for objective performance 
(corresponding to P < 1.6e-9).  Due to the assumptions made in solving the inverse 
problem of MEG source modeling, statistics in the source space should be considered as 
“descriptive” instead of veridical.   

 
As can be seen in Fig. 4, brain activity correlated with subjective awareness or objective 
performance appeared in the occipital cortex at ~200 ms.  It spread anteriorly into 
frontoparietal and temporal cortices by ~300 ms.  The most pronounced difference 
between subjective awareness and objective performance resides between 500 ms and 1.5 
sec, when brain activity correlated with subjective awareness covered widespread 
frontoparietal and temporal areas, while few source locations correlated with objective 
performance.  By about 2 ~ 2.5 sec, widespread brain activity again correlated with both 
subjective awareness and objective performance, likely in anticipation of the upcoming 
responses to questions.

Phase of Slow MEG Activity Correlates with Subjective Awareness 
Thus far we have shown that long-lasting MEG activity in the time domain correlates 
with subjective awareness.  We next investigated the frequency-domain characteristics of 
this activity.  Inspired by earlier studies (Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson et al., 2009), we 
first examined whether the phase of the MEG activity correlated with subjective 
awareness or objective performance, each with the other behavioral factor controlled for.  
For MEG activity from each sensor in each trial, Hilbert transform was used to extract the 
instantaneous phase in 20 frequency bands covering the range from 0.05 to 39 Hz.  We 
then performed a trial-by-trial two-way circular ANOVA (factors: SUB and OBJ) on the 
phase of MEG activity at every time-frequency location.  The results of this analysis from 
three representative subjects are shown in Fig. 5A.  At each time-frequency location, the 
number of sensors showing a significant (P < 0.001, uncorrected) effect of SUB (left) or 
OBJ (right) is plotted as color.  Significant correlations between MEG activity phase and 
 
subjective awareness occurred in the lowest frequencies (0.05 ~ 5 Hz), with the strongest 
effect in the 0.05 ~ 1 Hz band (Fig. 5A, left).  Much weaker correlations were found 
between MEG activity phase and objective performance (Fig. 5A, right).  Similar 
qualitative results were obtained in all subjects.

For group analysis, we conducted a paired t-test across subjects on the number of sensors 
showing a significant correlation between MEG activity phase and subjective awareness 
against those showing a correlation between phase and objective performance (P < 0.001 
for the effect of SUB or OBJ respectively, from ANOVA).  Only the lowest frequencies 
(<5 Hz) had a significant difference (Fig. 5B).  In particular, the 0.05 ~ 1 Hz band was 
the only frequency range showing a significant difference at and before the stimulus 
onset.  Changing the threshold for determining significant sensors from P < 0.001 to P < 
0.01 or P < 0.05 yielded very similar results (not shown).

The Distribution of SCP Phase in Seen vs. Unseen Trials 
The above results show that the phase of the SCP correlates with subjective awareness 
even after the effect of objective performance was removed.  This raises the following 
question: At which phase(s) of the SCP is stimulus presentation more likely to be 
consciously perceived?  To answer this question, we focused on the phase of 0.05 ~ 1 Hz 
activity at stimulus onset.  Fig. 6A shows MEG sensor locations with a significant 
correlation between phase and subjective awareness (assessed by the ANOVA) in an 
example subject (Subj. #1).  It can be seen that significant sensors formed spatial clusters.  
For the two largest clusters, the distribution of phase across seen and unseen trials are 
 
shown in Fig. 6B.  While the phase in unseen trials was distributed uniformly around the 
circle (blue lines), in seen trials it concentrated around π
4
 and − 3π
4
 in the two clusters, 
respectively.  Phase  and are opposite phases to each other, suggesting that the 
underlying dipole current flow is likely located between these two clusters of sensors in a 
perpendicular direction.

We next extracted two dominant clusters of sensors based on the correlation between 
phase (0.05 ~ 1Hz at stimulus onset) and subjective awareness for each subject in a 
similar manner (number of sensors included in each cluster: 12.8±2.8), and calculated 
their phase histograms for seen and unseen trials separately.  From the phase histogram 
we obtained two metrics: i) a phase-locking value (PLV) describing the degree of phase 
concentration across trials, with value 0 indicating a uniform distribution and value 1 
indicating identical phase value across trials; and ii) a preferred phase describing the most 
commonly observed phase.  For the 22 clusters, PLV is plotted against the preferred 
phase for seen (red) and unseen (blue) trials respectively (Fig. 6C).  The degree of phase 
concentration was significantly higher in seen trials than unseen trials (paired t-test on 
PLV across clusters, P < 1.6e-12).  Moreover, in unseen trials, the distribution of 
preferred phase across the 22 clusters did not depart from uniformity (Rao’s test for 
circular uniformity, P > 0.5), whereas the preferred phase in seen trials followed a 
bimodal distribution, concentrating around π
4
 and − 3π
4
 (departure from uniformity: P < 
0.01, Rao’s test).

π
4
−
3π
4
 
To ensure that the above results did not depend on our choice of clusters, we additionally 
performed a sensor-level analysis.  All sensors from all subjects with a significant 
correlation between phase and subjective awareness (P < 0.001, assessed by ANOVA) 
were included in this analysis.  We obtained the PLV and preferred phase for each sensor 
in seen and unseen trials respectively (Fig. 6D).  Across 635 sensors, the preferred phase 
in seen trials again clustered around π
4
 and − 3π
4
.  The degree of phase concentration 
was dramatically higher in seen trials than unseen trials (paired t-test on PLV across 
sensors, P < 2.6e-298).

Power of MEG Activity 
To investigate the relationship between the power of MEG activity and subjective 
awareness or objective performance, a three-way ANOVA (factors: SUB, OBJ and 
CONF) was carried out on MEG activity power from each sensor at every time-frequency 
location.  In addition to the ANOVA, we also performed a two-sample t-test on power 
between seen and unseen trials, and between correct and incorrect trials.  Because our 
previous analyses revealed widespread activity associated with subjective awareness 
(Figs. 3 & 4), for group analysis we adopted a whole-brain instead of region-of-interest 
approach.  For subjective awareness and objective performance, the t-score was summed 
across sensors showing a significant ANOVA result (at a P < 0.05 level for SUB and OBJ 
respectively, for details see Materials and Methods).  We then assessed whether this 
summed t-score (T) was significant across the 11 subjects (one-sample t-test against 0, 
corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster-based nonparametric permutation test).  
The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 7.  For the effect of subjective awareness 
 
(Fig. 7, left), we found that MEG power in α, β and low-γ frequency ranges 
(approximately 10 ~ 50 Hz) was lower in seen as compared with unseen trials, in a 
window of approximately 500 ms ~ 1 sec (cluster-level P < 0.001).  By contrast, MEG 
power in the lowest frequencies (2 ~ 6 Hz) was significantly higher in seen trials than 
unseen trials during a 500-ms-long window following stimulus onset (P < 0.001).  No 
significant result was observed in the high-γ frequency range.  The correlation between 
MEG power and objective performance in the low-mid frequency ranges (<30 Hz) was 
qualitatively similar but much weaker (Fig. 7, right), with decreased power in α and β
frequency ranges (P < 0.008) and increased power in the 2-Hz band (P < 0.02) in correct 
as compared with incorrect trials.  In addition, correct trials were associated with 
increased power in the high-γ frequency range (P < 0.008).

MEG Activity Correlated with Confidence 
Thus far we have focused on extracting brain activities underlying subjective awareness 
and objective performance while controlling for confidence as a covariate.  Lastly, we 
investigated brain activities contributing to confidence. While subjective awareness and 
objective performance are both binary variables, confidence measure in our paradigm is 
an ordinal variable with four levels.  Because ANOVA cannot extract MEG activity 
correlated with confidence in a monotonic manner, we adopted an alternative approach.
After source localization, trial-by-trial ordinal regression (De Martino et al., 2013) was 
carried out at each source location to identify MEG activity monotonically correlated 
with confidence, with the effects of subjective awareness and objective performance both 
controlled for.  The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 8.  Source activity correlated 
 
with confidence first appeared in the dorsal parietal cortex at around 200 ms.  It then 
moved anteriorly and had widespread frontoparietal distribution at ~500 ms.  The activity 
was restricted to posterior brain regions at ~750 ms and dissipated thereafter.  It 
reappeared around central and frontal cortices at 2 ~ 2.5 sec, possibly in anticipation of 
the upcoming responses to questions.  These results show that compared to subjective 
awareness (Fig. 4), confidence is associated with relatively transient MEG activity.  

Test-retest Reliability and Control for SNR across Behavioral Conditions 
Additional MEG data were collected for two control analyses.  Firstly, in order to assess 
test-retest reliability, we obtained three experimental sessions on different days in two 
additional subjects (Subj. #12 and #13). A three-way ANOVA (factors: SUB, OBJ and 
CONF) was carried out on data from each session in the sensor space.  Similar qualitative 
results were obtained across days in both subjects: namely, that long-lasting MEG 
activity correlated with subjective awareness but not objective performance (Fig. 9A).  
Because the sensor locations in relation to the brain varied across sessions, the spatial 
patterns of the activity were variable.

Secondly, because different behavioral conditions are associated with different numbers 
of trials (e.g., the three conditions in Fig. 2B contained 58, 32 and 24 trials, respectively), 
the differential SNR across conditions might confound our results.  To address this issue, 
in Subj. #12 and #13, we conducted a control analysis by using an identical number of 
trials in each condition to compute the ERF.  Results from a representative session in 
each subject are shown in Fig. 9B.  These results are similar to those shown in Fig. 2B: 
 	
long-lasting MEG activity was observed only in “Seen and correct” condition, but not in 
“Unseen and correct” or “Unseen and incorrect” conditions. Thus, after controlling for 
SNR, we confirmed that slow MEG activity correlates with subjective awareness but not 
objective performance.   

Slow EEG Activity Correlates with Subjective Awareness 
Previous EEG studies have established that the negative shift of scalp-recorded SCPs 
indexes increased cortical excitability (Rockstroh et al., 1989; Birbaumer et al., 1990).  
Because the polarity of MEG signals depends on the position and direction of the 
underlying dipole current flow in relation to the MEG sensor, there is no unique 
relationship between MEG signal polarity and changes in cortical excitability.  This is 
consistent with our finding that both positive- and negative- going slow MEG activities 
correlated with subjective awareness (Figs. 2 & 3).  To further elucidate the underlying 
cortical excitability state associated with subjective awareness, we carried out a 
preliminary EEG study.  The same two subjects as used in the additional MEG data 
collection (Subj. #12 and #13) each performed an EEG session under the same task 
paradigm.  We sorted all trials into three categories as in Figs. 2B and 9B – “Seen and 
correct”, “Unseen and correct”, “Unseen and incorrect”, and computed ERPs for each 
condition.  The results are shown in Fig. 10.  In the “Seen and correct” condition, we 
observed a transient negative potential at ~300 ms followed by long-lasting positive EEG 
potential that peaked around 500 ms and returned to baseline around 1.5 sec.  The 
transient negative potential was distributed posteriorly, corresponding to the initial 
feedforward excitation in the early and higher-order visual cortices.  The late positive 
 

potential had a central-parietal distribution, consistent with earlier studies (Dehaene and 
Changeux, 2011).  This slow positive EEG potential suggests that it was profound 
cortical inhibition, instead of excitation, that correlated with subjective awareness of the 
stimulus.  

Behavioral Control for Working Memory Decay 
So far our paradigm has used a relatively long post-stimulus blank period (3 ~ 6 sec) in 
order to elucidate slow brain activity uncontaminated by behavioral responses.  While 
this design is similar to several previous studies (e.g., Hesselmann et al., 2011), it 
introduces a potential behavioral confound of working memory decay during this period.  
To address this issue, we collected additional behavioral data in a cohort of 11 subjects 
using a 200-ms-long post-stimulus blank period under otherwise identical task design.
We compared the behavioral results using this new data (“Short duration”) with the 
original data under MEG recording (N = 11, “Long duration”, same as reported in Fig. 1), 
both analyzed according to signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966) (Fig. 11).    

For subjective awareness, the detection d’ was highly significant for both long-duration 
and short-duration tasks (P = 5e-7 and 0.0004, Fig. 11A).  Moreover, subjects adopted a 
conservative criterion in both tasks, as reflected in the criterion being significantly above 
0 (P = 8e-7 and 0.0008, Fig. 11A).  For objective performance, discrimination d’ was also 
highly significant for both long-duration and short-duration tasks (P = 8e-6 and 5e-5), 
while criterion was close to 0, indicating very small biases (Fig. 11B).  A two-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA on d’ [between-subject factor: task (long vs. short duration); 
 
within-subject factor: behavior (subjective awareness/detection vs. objective 
performance/discrimination)] revealed a significant effect for task (P < 0.01) with higher 
d’ in the long-duration task, while the effect of behavior and the interaction of duration × 
behavior were not significant.   The higher d’ during the long-duration task could be due 
to the smaller number of catch trials included therein, or better conscious/post-conscious
processing allowed by the longer post-stimulus blank duration.  A similar two-way 
ANOVA on criterion revealed a non-significant effect of task.

We next considered the discrimination d’ for objective performance against subjective 
awareness and confidence and found a similar pattern across both tasks (Fig. 11C).  The 
effect of subjective awareness was highly significant (Long duration: P = 4e-15; Short 
duration: P = 3e-9), and the interaction of subjective awareness and confidence was 
significant (Long duration: P = 0.01; Short duration: P = 0.0006), while confidence by 
itself was not significant in either task (P > 0.7).  Altogether, these results suggest that the 
behavioral results we obtained under MEG recording were qualitatively similar to those 
obtained in the behavioral control experiment with a much shorter post-stimulus blank 
period (200 ms vs. 3~6 sec) and therefore were unlikely to be significantly affected by 
potential working memory decay during the post-stimulus period.   

DISCUSSION 
In summary, we found that long-lasting, low-frequency MEG activity correlates with the 
state of subjective awareness, even after the effects of objective performance and 
confidence were both controlled for.  In the time domain, this activity lasts for up to 2 sec 
 
after the onset of a brief stimulus (<67 ms long).  In the frequency domain, the phase and 
power of the lowest frequencies (<5 Hz) correlate with subjective awareness.  By 
contrast, objective performance and confidence are both contributed by relatively 
transient brain activity.  These results provide strong support for the SCP hypothesis on 
conscious processing (He and Raichle, 2009b).  Lastly, source modeling suggests that 
widespread frontoparietal and temporal cortical areas contribute to the SCPs underlying 
subjective awareness.

Connection to Previous Literature on Conscious Perception 
Our results are consistent with the global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory of 
consciousness in terms of emphasizing late (>200 ms) activity and contributions from 
widespread brain areas (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011).  Our findings differ from the 
GNW framework in several aspects.  First, experimental work supporting the GNW 
theory has emphasized brain activity in the time window of 200 ~ 600 ms (Sergent et al., 
2005; Del Cul et al., 2007), while the long-lasting activity we observed persisted for ~2 
sec after stimulus offset.  This is potentially due to the fact that in these prior studies, a 
high-pass filter at around 0.5 Hz was applied (as opposed to 0.05 Hz used in the current 
study), such that the very slow activity was lost.  Secondly, studies under the GNW 
framework have generally interpreted the late EEG activity as part of the P3b potential 
(Sergent et al., 2005; Del Cul et al., 2007; Lamy et al., 2009).  Experimentally, this is 
consistent with the slow positive potential in seen trials observed in our EEG recordings 
(Fig. 10).  However, our interpretation of these results departs from the GNW theory.  
We think that the slow positive potential and the related P3b potential are part of the SCP 
 
family, indicating a reduction in cortical excitability (Birbaumer and Elbert, 1988; 
Deecke and Lang, 1988; He and Raichle, 2009a).  Thus, instead of “global ignition” or 
“broadcasting”, we believe that these data reveal global inhibition related to the updating 
of conscious content/working memory and simultaneous inhibition of irrelevant 
information when a particular stimulus reaches conscious awareness (Birbaumer and 
Elbert, 1988).

Our results showing that SCPs correlate with conscious perception are consistent with an 
earlier study reporting that elevated neuronal firing in the medial temporal lobe can 
persist for ~2 sec after the recognition of a brief stimulus in a visual backward masking 
paradigm (Quiroga et al., 2008).  Such long-lasting brain activity underlying conscious 
perception provides a potential mechanism for the well-documented effect that conscious 
experience can be modulated up to hundreds of milliseconds after stimulus offset or 
motor output by external events, as in flash-lag illusion (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000), 
post-stimulus cortical stimulation (Libet, 1982) or attentional cueing (Sergent et al., 
2013), and post-movement transcranial magnetic stimulation (Lau et al., 2007).   

A previous study reported that the phase of spontaneous SCP recorded by EEG over 
occipital cortex modulates conscious visual threshold, such that liminal stimuli presented 
on the negative SCP shift were more likely to be perceived (Devrim et al., 1999).  This 
result is consistent with a large literature showing that the negative shift of SCPs indexes 
increased cortical excitability (Rockstroh et al., 1989; Birbaumer et al., 1990).  At present 
the phase relationship between SCPs recorded by MEG and those recorded by EEG 
 
remains unknown.  We observed that across many sensors phase  and of slow 
(<1 Hz) MEG activity at stimulus onset predicted a higher probability of subjectively 
perceiving the stimulus (Fig. 6).  Phase  and are opposite phases to each other, 
consistent with the fact that MEG sensors located on opposite sides of a dipole record 
activities that are mirror images of each other with opposite signs.  Future simultaneous 
EEG-MEG studies will be needed to elucidate the phase relationship between EEG- and 
MEG- recorded SCPs.

A recent study using a whisker stimulus detection task in rodents found more depolarized 
membrane potentials in primary sensory neurons at 100~300 ms following stimulus onset 
during hit than miss trials (Sachidhanandam et al., 2013).  This result corresponds well 
with our EEG finding of a negative potential at ~300 ms over posterior visual regions 
(Fig. 10).  Nonetheless, whole-brain EEG allowed us to observe the ensuing widespread 
positive potential over frontoparietal cortices.  In addition, subjective report in human 
subjects avoids the ambiguity of using detection performance to infer the state of 
subjective perception.

Increased power in the gamma-frequency range was previously reported to correlate with 
conscious perception (Fisch et al., 2009; Gaillard et al., 2009; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 
2009).  By contrast, we found gamma-frequency power to correlate with objective 
performance but not subjective awareness (Fig. 7).  A major distinction between the 
current work and these previous studies is that we controlled for objective performance 
π
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 
and confidence.  Consistent with our finding, a recent study found localized gamma-
frequency power to be correlated with sensory evidence but not conscious perception 
(Aru et al., 2012b).

Connection to Previous Literature on Metacognitive Confidence
We found that after the effects of subjective awareness and objective performance were 
controlled for, early (~200 ms) MEG activity in the dorsal parietal cortex and late (~2.5 
sec) MEG activity in the anterior prefrontal cortex both correlated with subjects’ 
confidence level (Fig. 8).  These results are respectively consistent with prior primate 
neurophysiology (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009) and human functional/anatomical MRI (De 
Martino et al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013) studies.  Our findings suggest that the 
different brain regions uncovered by neurophysiology and fMRI might simply reflect the 
difference in temporal sensitivities of these methods.   

Mechanisms of SCPs
Early neurophysiological studies suggested: “Simultaneous recording of membrane 
potentials, extracellular and intracellular recording from apical dendrites, and field 
potentials clearly demonstrate long-lasting EPSPs at the apical dendrites as the main 
factor underlying negative SCPs” (Birbaumer et al., 1990).  However, to date the source 
of these long-lasting EPSPs remains unclear.  Nonetheless, there are several plausible and 
not mutually exclusive candidates.  First, recurrent excitatory neuronal networks may 
constitute a prominent source of long-lasting EPSPs (Major and Tank, 2004; Wong and 
Wang, 2006; Chaudhuri et al., 2014).  Second, long-lasting cellular mechanisms such as 
 
calcium spikes (Larkum, 2013), metabotropic receptors (Zhang and Seguela, 2010) and 
the endocannabanoid pathway (Carter and Wang, 2007) could potentially produce long-
lasting EPSPs in the SCP time-scale.  Third, it has been long conjectured that neural 
modulations such as acetylcholine might play a role in generating SCPs (Birbaumer et al., 
1990).  A recent study demonstrating that cholinergic inputs to layer I could selectively 
disinhibit layer II/III pyramidal neurons lends substantial credence to this idea (Letzkus et 
al., 2011).  Future experimental investigations should test and refine these predictions.  A 
promising avenue is to combine DC-recordings of field potentials (Kahn et al., 2013; Pan 
et al., 2013) with pharmacological manipulations or stimulation of specific cell types in 
different cortical layers.

Caveats and Future Questions 
Our results suggest that the waveform, phase and power of slow MEG activity correlate 
with the state of subjective awareness from trial to trial, after objective performance and 
confidence were both controlled for.  These results provide strong support for the SCP 
hypothesis on conscious processing (He and Raichle, 2009b).  Nonetheless, it is 
important to clarify that not all SCPs are directly related to conscious processing.  For 
example, unconscious modulation of brain excitability can also manifest as SCPs (Libet 
et al., 1983; Elbert, 1990).  This is not in conflict with the SCP hypothesis on conscious 
processing – as we stated in the original paper (He and Raichle, 2009b), “These results, 
however, do not suggest that the negative SCP, whenever it appears, is an index of 
conscious awareness.”  A crucial goal for future research is to elucidate the difference in 
spatiotemporal patterns of the SCPs related to unconscious vs. conscious processing.
 

Secondly, the relationship between our results and various forms of memory should be 
explored in future experiments.  It is unlikely that visual persistence or iconic memory 
confounds our results.  Visual persistence lasts up to several hundred milliseconds and 
iconic memory up to a second – both are much shorter than our SCP findings (Sperling, 
1960; Coltheart, 1980).  Moreover, both visual persistence and iconic memory are 
strongest right after stimulus offset and decay in a monotonic fashion; by contrast, we 
found that SCPs correlated with subjective awareness reach their peak at ~500 ms and 
decay thereafter (Figs. 2C, 3 & 10).  Nonetheless, the potential roles of fragile visual 
short-term memory (FM) and working memory (WM) should be further investigated in 
future studies.  Existing evidence suggests that FM is a form of location- and object- 
specific short-term memory store that is likely mediated by higher-order visual areas such 
as V4 and inferotemporal cortex (Sligte et al., 2009; Pinto et al., 2013).  As such, neural 
processes underlying FM might manifest in the negative SCP potential peaking at 300 ~ 
400 ms localized to posterior visual regions that was observed in our EEG experiment 
(Fig. 10).  Moreover, as discussed earlier, the widespread cortical inhibition thereafter, 
indicated by slow positive potentials at >500 ms (Fig. 10), might be related to the 
updating of WM when a stimulus reaches conscious awareness.  At present, it remains 
unclear whether these – conscious access, FM, and WM update – are separable processes 
(e.g., see discussions in Sligte et al., 2008).  In addition, it is possible that delaying 
responses in our paradigm introduced a sustained WM component (e.g., Vogel and 
Machizawa, 2004); future studies dissociating these processes will be valuable.   

 
Lastly, the separation of the NCC from NCC-pr and NCC-co in our study is likely 
incomplete.  Our analyses were able to disentangle these phenomena to the extent that 
objective performance captures NCC-pr and metacognitive confidence captures NCC-co.  
However, there are likely NCC-pr and NCC-co processes not captured by these measures.  
For example, it has long been postulated that conscious perception could lead to verbal 
report or the formation of long-term memory (Baars, 1988).  Although our paradigm did 
not involve overt verbal report, and the effect of long-term memory was likely mitigated 
by repeated presentations of a minimal stimulus, at present it is not possible to rule out 
latent processes as such.  These caveats notwithstanding, the current study constitutes a 
significant step forward in the ongoing effort to disentangle conscious from unconscious 
brain processes and distill the NCC from NCC-pr and NCC-co.   

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Figure Legends
Figure 1. Task paradigm and behavioral results.  (A) In each trial, a Gabor patch with 
 
two possible orientations (45° or 135°) is shown for a brief duration, sandwiched between 
two blank screens.  The duration distribution of the second blank screen from an example 
subject is shown in the inset.  At the end of each trial, the subject is prompted to answer 
three sequential questions at their own pace.  (B) The total fractions of trials in which the 
subjects reported seeing the stimulus (“seen” answers to the 2nd question) or correctly 
discriminated the orientation of the Gabor patch (correct answers to the 1st question).  (C)
The fraction of correct trials (based on orientation discrimination) in “seen” and “unseen” 
trials respectively.  (D) Objective performance (based on orientation discrimination) 
conditioned on subjective awareness (“seen” vs. “unseen”) and confidence level.  (E)
Subjective awareness conditioned on objective performance (correct vs. incorrect) and 
confidence level.  In B-E, results are averaged across subjects, with error bars denoting 
s.e.m. across subjects.  

Figure 2.  ERFs.  (A) Data from Subj. #1.  Top: All trials were sorted into “seen” and 
“unseen” groups, and averaged separately.  Bottom: All trials were sorted by whether the 
orientation of the Gabor patch was correctly identified; correct and incorrect trials were 
averaged separately.  Different traces indicate different MEG sensors.  Four sensors are 
highlighted in thicker lines for visualization purpose.  (B) Data from Subj. #1.  All trials 
were sorted into four categories: seen and correct (top), unseen and correct (middle), 
unseen and incorrect (bottom), seen and incorrect (not shown, due to the small number of 
trials), and averaged separately.  The same four sensors as in A are highlighted.  (C)
Grand average on the absolute value of the MEG activity time course across all sensors 
and all subjects, for the three task conditions separately: Seen and correct (red); Unseen 
 
and correct (blue); Unseen and incorrect (green).  Shaded areas indicate s.e.m. across 
subjects.

Figure 3.  Trial-by-trial three-way ANOVA (factors: OBJ, SUB and CONF) in the 
sensor space. (A) Results from the ANOVA for subjective awareness (left column) and 
objective performance (right column), respectively.  Three example subjects are shown.  
For each subject, the ANOVA result from each MEG sensor is shown in a separate row.
Color indicates P-values for the effect of SUB or OBJ, with warm colors indicating 
higher MEG activity in seen or correct trials, and cool colors indicating higher MEG 
activity in unseen or incorrect trials.  (B) The number of significant sensors correlated 
with subjective awareness (blue) or objective performance (red) (P < 0.05, three-way 
ANOVA) averaged across all 11 subjects.  Shaded areas denote s.e.m. across subjects.  
Red dots indicate the time points at which the two curves significantly depart (P < 0.05, 
paired t-test across subjects).  (C) The P-values of the paired t-test comparing the two 
curves in B.  Red dashed line indicates the P = 0.01 level.  (D-E) As in B, except that 
significant sensors were determined by a threshold of P < 0.01 (D) or P < 0.001 (E).

Figure 4.  Trial-by-trial three-way ANOVA (factors: OBJ, SUB and CONF) in the 
source space. At each source location, color indicates the percentage of subjects 
showing a significant (P < 0.05) effect of subjective awareness (Sub) or objective 
performance (Obj).  Only source locations with at least 4 out of 10 subjects showing a 
significant result are included (corresponding to population-level P < 0.001, uncorrected).
Ten time points from 100 ms to 2.5 sec after stimulus onset are shown.   
 	

Figure 5.  Trial-by-trial two-way circular ANOVA (factors: OBJ, SUB) on phase in 
the sensor space. (A) Results from the ANOVA for subjective awareness (left column) 
and objective performance (right column) respectively.  Results from 3 example subjects 
are shown.  Color plots the number of significant (P < 0.001) sensors at each time-
frequency location.  (B) A paired t-test across all 11 subjects was performed at each time-
frequency location on the number of sensors showing a significant (P < 0.001) SUB vs. 
OBJ effect.  The P-values are plotted as color and thresholded at P < 0.01.

Figure 6.  Phase of low-frequency MEG activity in seen vs. unseen trials. (A) Scalp 
plot of P-values for the effect of subjective awareness determined by the two-way 
ANOVA on phase (0.05 ~ 1 Hz activity at stimulus onset), from an example subject 
(Subj. #1).  Two dominant sensor clusters are defined by the contour of P-values (P < 
0.0001, indicated by *).  (B) The phase histograms for seen (red) and unseen (blue) trials 
for the two dominant clusters in A.  (C) Phase-locking value (PLV) is plotted against 
preferred phase for the two dominant clusters from each subject, calculated for seen (red) 
and unseen (blue) trials separately.  The numbers indicate the cluster number (from 1 to 
22).  (D) PLV and preferred phase for all significant (P < 0.001, from ANOVA result for 
SUB effect) sensors in seen (red) and unseen (blue) trials respectively.  The blue 
sinusoidal curves at the bottom of C and D show that phase 0 relates to the peak of the 
fluctuation, and phase ±π to the trough of the fluctuation. 

Figure 7.  Group analysis results on MEG power for the effect of subjective 
 

awareness (left) and objective performance (right).  For each subject and at each time-
frequency location, the t-scores from a two-sample t-test (seen vs. unseen, or correct vs. 
incorrect) were summed across significant sensors as determined by the ANOVA (T,
see Materials and Methods).  The T value was subjected to a population test across 
subjects (one-sample t-test against 0), and the resulting t-score is plotted as color in the 
top panels.  Warm colors indicate that power was higher in seen (left) or correct (right) 
trials; cool colors indicate that power was higher in unseen or incorrect trials.  Bottom: 
Significant time-frequency clusters after controlling for multiple comparisons using a 
nonparametric permutation test.  The statistical significance of each cluster is indicated in 
the graph; color is the same as in top panels, indicating the population-test t-score.

Figure 8.  MEG activity correlated to confidence in the source space.  At each source 
location, the relationship between estimated source activity and confidence level was 
evaluated by ordinal regression (covariates: SUB and OBJ).  Only source locations with 
at least two subjects showing a significant result were included.  The agreement 
coefficient (see Materials and Methods) is plotted as color at different post-stimulus time 
points.

Figure 9.  Test-retest reliability assessment and control for SNR.  (A) Sensor-space 
three-way ANOVA (factors: SUB, OBJ and CONF) was carried out for each recording 
session in Subj. #12 and #13.  The effect of SUB and OBJ are shown in the left and right 
columns, respectively.  Format is the same as in Fig. 3A.  (B) The ERFs from a 
representative session in each subject (day 2 in Subj. #12; day3 in Subj. #13) for three 
 
conditions separately: “Seen and correct”, “Unseen and correct” and “Unseen and 
incorrect”.  The number of trials was equated across the three conditions by dropping out 
a random fraction of trials, resulting in 84 trials per condition in Subj. #12 and 76 trials 
per condition in Subj. #13.  Format is the same as in Fig. 2B.  

Figure 10.  DC-EEG data from Subj. #12 (A) and Subj. #13 (B).  ERPs from all 
electrodes are shown for three conditions: “Seen and correct” (middle row), “Unseen and 
correct” and “Unseen and incorrect” (bottom row).  The numbers of trials included in 
each condition are indicated in the figure.  The scalp topography of voltage distribution at 
selected time points for the “Seen and correct” condition are shown in the top row.

Figure 11.  Behavioral control for the duration of post-stimulus blank period.  
Behavioral data from the MEG sessions (“Long duration”, same as data used in Fig. 1) 
and from behavioral testing in an additional cohort of 11 subjects using a 200-ms post-
stimulus blank period (“Short duration”) are analyzed according to signal-detection 
theory.  (A) Detection d’ and criterion c for subjective awareness.  (B) Discrimination d’ 
and criterion c for objective performance.  (C) Discrimination d’ under different states of 
subjective awareness (seen vs. unseen) and confidence level.  In all graphs, error bars 
denote s.e.m. across subjects.  













